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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
FLORA K. JONES, widow, and DONNA
JONES, ~IELBA JOXES, IIAROLD JONES,
LINDA JONES and SHIRLEY JONES,
minor children of HAROLD MINOR
JONES. Deceased,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
THE INDUS~rRIAL CO~LMISSION OF UTAH
and CALIFORNIA PACKING CORPORATION,
a corporation,
Defendants.
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF AND ASSOCIATE
JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH.
Comes now the defendants in the above entitled
cause, and respectfully petition this Honorable Court
for a rehearing in said cause for the reasons and upon
the grounds hereinafter briefly set forth:
I

The Court erred in holding that Dr. Peterson's
testimony was "that it was his opinion that in this case
the exertion did cause the clot", and hence erred in
holding that there was no conflict in the medical testimony.
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II
The Court erred in holding- that the deceased as
a matter of fact and of law was in the course of his
employment subject to exertion and fatigue to an
extent sufficient to be a contributing- factor to his coronary occlusion.
III
The Court erred in holding- that the Commission
was arbitrary and capricious in its finding that the
death of the deceased was not contributed to by any of
the conditions or activities of the deceased in connection
with his employment.

IV
The Court erred in holding- that the Commission
acted arbitrarily in refusing- to find that the injury to
the deceased did result from his employment.

BRIEF IN SUPPORrr OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
As counsel for defendants we approach the matter
of this petition with infinite deference to the Court, as
it is apparent from the nature of the opinions rendered
and the length of time the court had the matter under
consideration that the problem presented has received
the deepest thought. However, it is likewise apparent
from the opinions that the majority of the court has
failed fully to appreciate the effect of its reversal ·of
the facts found by the Commission, or to recognize the
conclusiveness of the findings of the Commission upon
the facts, and to the end that the court may re-examine
the question and correctly interpret the law applicable
thereto, this petition and brief is respectfully filed ..
2
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'Ye of nec-essity as::mme that the court will accord
us freedom to express our criticism of the decision of
the majority, and to develop our views thereon. We
sincerely feel that serious and grave error will result
if the opinion heretofore rendered is released. The
question involved is in part that of jurisdiction between
the Industrial Commission and this Court, and the extent to which this Court can control the Commission
in its findings in Workmen's Compensation cases; a
matter of grave concern to the public generally.
rrhe sum and substance of the majority opinion
herein is (1) that there was no conflict in the medical
evidence, and hence the Commission was arbitrary in
refusing to find a causal connection between the employment and the injury, as found by Dr. Zeman and
Dr. Olson upon the hypothetical facts assumed by them:
and (2) that the Commission was arbitrary in failing
to find as true facts those matters assumed as true by
Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson as the premise for their
conclusion of causal relationship. The assignments of
error fall under one or the other of these points, and
hence we discuss the matter under these two points of
argum~nt.

ARGUMENT
I
THERE WAS A CONFLICT IN THE MEDICAL TESTIMONY, AND HENCE THE COMMISSION WAS NOT ARBITRARY IN FINDING NO CAUSAL CONNECTION BETWEEN
THE EMPLOYMENT AND THE INJURY.

There is little we can say on this point which is not
stated by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion,
3
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but we would te remiss in our duty as attorneys for
defendant if we did not ourselves challenge the torturing by the majority of this Court of the word "possibly"
in the statement by Dr. Peterson
''My own opinion is that it possibly 1s related
in this particular case * * *.''
into a meaning that in his opinion the exertion "did
cause the clot". We can only conclude with Mr. Justice Wolfe that this interpretation by the majority
"is born of a desire to harmonize his testimony
with that of the other two doctors."
and thus enable the majority of the Court to escape the
dilemma of any conflict in the medical testimony.
Where, then, is the capriciousness~ Is it the
Industrial Commission which, after hearing the witness, the inflection of his words, his manner of speaking,
chose to interpret his meaning of the word "possibly"
as that of there being a very remote likelihood of any
causal connection~ Or is it the majority of this Court,
who to gain a uniformity of testimony on the particular point, impress upon the word a meaning at complete variance with that normally attributed to iU
We have posed the query as to which is arbitrary
or capricious In this particular matter - the Commission in ascribing to the word ''possibly'' a negative
conclusion, or the majority of this court in attributing
an affirmative conclusion. We submit to the court
this test:
4
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~\.~~·'tlllll' that Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson had testified in their opinion there "·as 110 causal connection
between the employment and the injury. Dr. Petersen
had then testified just as he did :

·'I can't answer the question yes or no
because I don't think the medical literature from
my own opinion or anybody else's opinion can
say dogmatically this is a definite cause, because
the medical literature is full of statements that
there is some relationship between effort and
coronary thrombosis; and the literature is full
of statements to the effect that apparently effort
has no relationship to coronary thrombosis . . .
My own opinion is that it possibly is related in
this particular case, but I don't think you can
dogmatically say that it is a cause and effect
or it has no effect." (Emphasis added)
Then upon this testimony of Dr. Petersen the Commission had found a causal connection and made an
award, and the finding of the Commission had been
challenged as arbitrary in assigning to the opinion of
Dr. Petersen a meaning at complete variance with any
normal use of the words.
Frankly, we have not the slightest doubt that this
Court on review would refuse to permit the Commission, in order to gain an award to twist the phrase "it
possibly is related in this particular case'' into a meaning that there was causal connection.
Yet that is just what the majority of this Cou~
itself here does. In order to defeat the negative implication of Dr. Petersen's testimony it (arbitrarily)
asserts that Dr. Petersen did not mean what he said,
5
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and that while he testified that there· was but a remote
likelihood of any connection, what he in fact meant
was that ''in his opinion in this case the exertion did
cause the clot".

POINT II
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION WAS NOT
ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS IN FAILING
TO FIND AS TRUE FACTS THOSE MATTERS ASSUJ\1:ED AS TRUE BY DR. ZEMAN
AND DR. OLSON, AS THE PRE~IISE FOR
THEIR CONCLUSION OF CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP.
No one likes to be accused of being arbitrary or
capricious - much less to admit it. We cannot sincerely ascribe any arbitrariness to the Commission in
giving a negative implication to Dr. Petersen's testimony, tather than an affirmative implication as does
the majority of the Court, but likewise we cannot require
the Court to accept our views. In other words, it's one
of those things we can't do anything about other than
to urge upon the court the logic of the proposition
that it is far less arbitrary for the Commission to interpret the words of Dr. Petersen in their normal and
usual way, than for this Court to ascribe to them a
meaning which it admits is exactly "opposite" their
usual connotation.
We can, however, do something about the secon,d
point of our argument, namely, demonstrate to this
court that it has inadvertently acted outside and in
excess of its jurisdiction in finding this injury to be
employment connected, when the Commission's finding on this particular point is to the contrary.
6
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The line of demarl'ation fixing the Supreme Court·~
jurisdiction to reYiew decision~ by the Industrial Commission is express in the statutes. Section 42-1-78 in
part provides
•' * * • The review shall not be extended
further than to determine:

( 1) Whether or not the commission acted
without or in excess of its powers.
(2) If findings of fact are made, whether or
not such findings of fact support the award
under review.''

And Section -!2-1-79 (as amended)
''After each formal hearing, it shall be the
duty of the commission to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law irt writing an4 file
the same with its secretary. The findings and
conclusions of the commission on questions of
fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not
be subject to review; such questions of fact shall
include ultimate facts and the findings and conclusions of the commission. * * * . ''
Pronouncements by this court adhering to this line
of demarcation are myriad. A rather composite analysis of the matter is to be found in the decision i:p_ the
case of Norris v. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah 256,
61 P. 2d 413 (cited by this Court in the opinion) as
follows:
"It may be well to sum up the principles
laid down in a number of previous cases regarding the jurisdiction of this court over awards
and orders of the Commission.

7
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'' 'l,he Legislature has, in effect, said:
'The Commission is the final arbiter of
the facts. If there is error in judgment or
conclusions of or from facts, it must be the
Commission's error and remain there. We
give the Supreme Court the right to speak
onl.v by warrant of law in compensation
cases when it speaks in reference to errors
of law alleged to have been made by the
Commission.'

" ** *
"Where the matter presented on appeal is
the question of whether the commission should
have in law arrived at a conclusion of fact different from that at which it did arrive from the
e'Vidence, a question of law is presented only
when it is claimed that the commission could
only arrive at one conclusion from the evidence,
and that it found contrary to that inevitable
conclusion. But in order to reverse the commission in this regard it must appear at least
that (a) the evidence is uncontradicted, and (b)
there is nothing in the record which is intrinsically discrediting to the uncontradicted testimony and (c) that the uncontradicted evidence
is not wholly that of interested witnesses or,
it the uncontradicted evidence is wholly ot
partly from others than interested witnesses,
that the record shows no bias or prejudice on
the part of such other witnesses, and (d) the
uncontradicted evidence is such as to carry a
measure of conviction to the reasonable mind
and sustain the burden of proof, and (e) precludes any other explanation or hypothesis as
being more or equally as reasonable, and (f)
there is nothing in the record which would indicate that the presence of the witnesses gave
8
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the commission such an advantage over the eourt
in aid to its conclusions that the conclusions
should for that reason not be disturbed.''
Thus the law is well settled. Questions of fact
are for the Commission, and for the Commission alone.
We apply this principle to the instant case.
The testimony of Dr. Olson and Dr. Zeman of a
causal connection was based upon a stated set of facts,
the existence of which the doctors were required to assume. But their opinions of necessity can be no stronger
than the premise upon which they rest, namely, the existence of the facts assumed, a 11 d whether those fa.cts
exist or not is for the Commission to determine. Not
for the doctors and not for this court. This determination is for the Commission alone.
The Court criticizes the Commission for not accepting the conclusions of the doctors' testimony that
there was causal connection. We submit that the criticism at best can be well founded only if the facts, and
all of the facts, assumed by the doctors did in law exist.
The Commission found that some thereof did not. The
question then becomes, not whether the Commission ·
was arbitrary in declining to accept the doctors' conclusions, but whether it was arbitrary in failing to
accept as established in law those facts upon which the
doctors premised their conclusions.
In fact it goes even further. Fatigue and exertion
certainly are here involved. The doctors' .conclusio:n:s·
are premised upon a degree of fatigue and exertion
being present. No one· testified directly upon these
matters, so the question of whether Jones was .either
9
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fatigued or exerted himself, and if so, the degree thereof, must be inferred from the testimony of what he
was and what he had been doing; In other words, the
concluding fact as to whether the deceased was fatigued
or exerted himself is derived, not from the evidence
itself, but from the inferences to he drawn therefrom.
Now, whose duty is it to draw inferences from the
evidence 1 This, too, has been well settled by the decisions of the c.ourt. One of the later pronouncements
is that of Utah Fuel Compa;ny v. Industrial Commission,
102 Utah 26, 126 P. 2d 1070:

''It is not the duty or right of this court to
say what inferences, or conclusions must he drawn
from the facts, so long as there is competent evidence to sustain them. This proposition has been
reiterated so often in numerous decisions that
further citations of cases is unnecessary.''
We return to our premises. Both Dr. Zeman and
Dr.. Olson agreed that a degree of exertion and fatigue
was. necessary to their theory. With respect to fatigue
Dr. Zeman testified upon cross examination as follows:

"Q So that when you come down to it after
all, it is a question that if there is any causal
connection between fatigue and coronary thrombosis or occlusion, it is a question of degree,
isn't itf
''A Well, yes.

'' Q In other words, I might get very tired
by undergoing some exertion whereas you might
not get tired doing it.
10 E:
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"A You will not expect the same effects. I
mean you may not be conscious of the same effect, but certainly you would haYe fatigue similar.

"Q Yes, but I would not have fatigue that
would be of that degree that would cause coronary occlusion'
"A No.

•'Q So that after all it is a question of the
effect, isn't it' That is a question in a particular case under which the trier of the fact
thought there is such a degree of fatigue that
it might affect the coronary to such an extent
that you have indicated, isn't that right~
"A I don't follow that.

'' Q After all, it being a question of the
degree of fatigue, then it is a question of the
effect to either be determined by whoever is expressing an opinion, or by the trier of facts as
in this case, whether or not that fatigue is sufficient to cause coronary occlusion 1
''A I think so.

"Q In other words, you sit here, and having
heard this explanation made by Counsel, as to
the condition of this individual, you arrive at an
opinion as to what that degree of fatigue was
from that description~
"A I think I mentioned fatigue as one factor.

'' Q Then you mean to say, Doctor, in your
judgment, this question all comes back to the
fact, and that is whether the fatigue in and of
itself would be sufficient in your opinion to cause
under these circumstances, this coronary~
11
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"A The fatigue, as indicated by a previous
lack of rest. At that moment I was not considering any additional active effort.

"Q No.
''A I simply said that it added some ·force to
the fatigue if we consider the case as a whole.

"Q That means, does it not, an'alyzed, that
fatigue in and of itself might not he sufficient,
but added to some· other element might be sufficient~

''A Wben there is fatigue" Q You are assuming a certain fatigue. You
are assuming from the description that there
was at least in connection with other factors,
sufficient to cause this coronary, isn't that correcti
"A Immediate effort plus his previous effort
which has been put down as fatigue, if you desire, in the conditions such as existed here.

'' Q Can you assume there was enough to
cause

fatigue~

"A I have not assumed that.

'' Q I know, but assume there was no effort,
but simply fatigue.
''A Yes, I think fatigue-

" Q You think fatigue alone can do it, but it
would have to be the kind of fatigue which in
your judgment existed according to the description in this case~
d

A It might give the headaches.

"Q Would you say any fatigue whatever
would cause it~

12
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•• A "\Y onld yon please define fatigue'!

· •Q I assume that yon meant a man being
tired.

Isn't that a description of it'

'• A A man being tired may not be fatigue.
He may be tired. \Y e are talking objectively
about something that is supposed to be a burden
on his physical status.

•' Q You mean something that has made him
fatigued, is that true 1
"A Of course we can be tired without effort.

•· Q I understand you to say there need be
no effort, and that fatigue in and of itself is
sufficient. Is that correct'
"A Yes.

·' Q What do you mean by fatigue'
"A I think I have indicated that fatigue is
the end result is any process representing an
accumulation of waste, and a lack of rest, and
resumption of normal activity.

'' Q So it would be lack of bed rest'
''A It can be, and ordinarily it is a physiological change.

'' Q Depending on the degree of fatigue and
depending on the amount of rest that would be
required.
''A Up to a certain point, when you get to
a certain point.

'' Q Assuming when a man becomes tired he
lies down and rests for awhile, wouldn't that
have a tendency to overcome the fatigue 1
''A It might.

13
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'' Q The duration of the rest might be very
short and it might not, and still cause recovery
from the fatigue? In other words, can I go home
at noon very tired, and lie down for a long time,
or rest, and completely recover from my fatigue¥
"A You may, and you may still be carrying the debt.

"Q At least the debt has been minimized,
and may be minimized down enough so that I
may wake up as fresh as I was in the morning¥
"A That would be the subjective view.

"Q Isn't that also the objective view¥
"A Yes.
And with respect to effort Dr. Zeman testified:

"Q What do you say about effort f
have mentioned that as one of the factors.

You

"A Yes.

'' Q Assuming he was performing exactly
the same duty under the same conditions exactly
the day b~fore this as he was this day, that is,
he was tinkering with the motor as has been described either with relation to the carburetor or
cranking it, exactly the same as the day before,
would that have any effect upon your conclusion f
''A We may have a number of variables,
all of which are invariable. There might be one
variable which he had that will produce what
we have· here.

"Q It might be a factor and it might not.
''A All I can say, we have the end result.

14
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''Q Oh, yes, we have the end result. You
are assuming now because a thing happened
contemporaneously, they are related by cause
and effect.
"A In a way.

'' Q Doctor, you testified sometime ago in
the VVoodburn case?
"A Yes.

'' Q And that is a case where the man became
tired too, was it not?
"A Yes.

'' Q And layed down as a result of being
tired?
"A Yes.

'' Q And yet you testified in that case, did
you not~ that the most that you could say was
that it might be a possibility that there was some
causal connection between the condition of the
man and the coronary which ensued?
''A That is a good many years ago. I have
seen many cases since then.

"Q You think you have acquired knowlege
since then that made you change your opinion?
"A Yes.

'' Q And that is because of the fact that you
have seen cases where there was fatigue and also
a coronary thereafter, is that correct?
''A Closely related thereafter.

"Q And yet you have seen these cases where
there was no fatigue, have you not?
"A I think so, yes su.
15'
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'' Q But nevertheless, you conclude that because there was fatigue, and the coronary ensued,
that therefore there is some causal connection between the two, is that correct 1
"A In this case, yes.

'' Q In this case. Why do you distinguish
this case from any other case 1
"A Because there is a history.

'' Q In other words, you have to have something else besides fatigue, do you not; you have
to have effort, or you could not say there was
any causal connection 1
"A Effort and fatigue adds up to the same
thing.

'' Q Do you want to retract that statement
that you just made that it would require effort
in addition to fatigue~
"A No, I don't quite understand.

'' Q Didn't you say that in this case, distinguishing it from other cases where there was
mere fatigue, that there was also efforU
"A No, that is not what I said. I said that
coronary disease may occur without, but in this
case it does not.

'' Q I asked you why you distinguished between this and other cases, and you said on account
of effort.
''A I said on account of the history.

'' Q What is the history that causes you to
distinguish this case from the other cases~
''A The history presented.

16
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· · Q 'Vhat are the factors 1
"A Fatigue and effort, and somewhere 1
got the suspicion there was emotion, but that
was stricken.

·• Q Do you eliminate emotion 1
•• A I have not eliminated it. You eliminated
it.

· · Q You would say that irrespective of
whether there was any emotional strain, fatigue
and the other factors would be sufficient, is that
correct?
•'A I don't know what it was that is in this
case, but there was fatigue and also effort and
also emotioH, and there may be enough in a definite given case to produce coronary occlusion."
(Emphasis added)

As to Dr. Olson, he testified:

"Q Well, Doctor when you get down to brass
tacks on this situation, in your opinion, it depends
on the extent of these factors you have named as
to whether there would be any causal connection
between them and the occlusion 1
''A Only in degree. It is an individual in
his environment. In orie individual it may take
a tremendous amount, and in another very little.

'' Q You didn't know this individual?
"A No, but I know he had coronary thrombosis.

"Q But you didn't know this particular individual, and you didn't know the effect or the
effects it may have had on this individual1
"A Not definitely, no.

17
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'' Q So you can't tell, can you, to what extent
these various factors would affect this man as a
particular individual~
"A As a matter of knowledge·, no.

"Q Of course, as a matter of knowledge. Now
you assumed in this case, stress, is that right,
worry1
''A Worry and concern.

'' Q Concern.
''A Anxiety.

'' Q Anxiety. You are assuming that, but
assuming that that was not present, then that
would have to be eliminated, would it not?
"A Certainly. If you assume they weren't
present, they would be eliminated.

'' Q To the extent he was tired or fatigued,
that would also vary with respect to various
individuals, would it not~
''A That is my experience.

'' Q So there again that actual fact would
have to be considered and it would have to
be assumed by the prior evidence and that
his being tired was of such a character that it
would affect him, wouldn't you, or else you would
have to eliminate that~
"A I see your method of approach. Let me
get this-

" Q I don't care what my method of approach
is.
''A You are speaking as an experienced
Attorney, and I am replying to you as an experienced physican. If I am informed that a man has
18;
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worked in hot weatht>r and he wa~ working for
sixteen or eighteen hours, and only a few, hours
rest, and returned to that work, one has to consider that one could not avoid experiencing exhaustion.

'' Q You are assuming he had worked from
sixteen to eighteen hours with only two hours
rest and went back1
''A I would not give you a basis in figures.

"Q Those figures are what you used and you
are assuming that as a fact in arriving at your
conclusion 1
''A Two or three hours rest, something like
that, yes, of course.

"Q And if that condition didn't exist, and
he had sufficient rest from being tired, then you
would have to eliminate that?
''A That depends on the facts.

'' Q Now the same is true with inhaling the
fumes. It depends on the extent to which he
would have inhaled them. I can walk by an automobile from which monoxide gas is eoming out
of the exhaust, and still not consume enough to
make me have coronary.
''A Yes. I don't think that is too germane
to this particular case.

'' Q You are inclined to think the inhaling
of the gas we are talking about is practically eliminated1
''A I would not say that along with the other
factors. I would say it is not very important.
'' Q In other words, you base it on the anxiety
or the stress and upon his being tired?
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''A I think it will have to be considered as being important because it increases the work on his
heart, and it increases the metabolism and it
ma:k:es agreater demand on the part of the heart.
We know that this man had an atheromatous
plaque, so that the muscles beyond that point
where the atheromatous plaque is weren't supplied with the oxgen required.

"Q rrhen you would only include effort?
"A Yes.

'' Q Then the extent of that effort would also
have a bearing, would it not, as a factor?
''A Upon a given individual, and on this individual under the circumstances and in the environment.

".Q In other words, it would have to be a
combination?
''A Yes, acting upon a particular individual.

'' Q Acting upon a particular individual, and
the extent to which these factors collectively
would act on a particular individual is not known
to you or anybody else¥
· ''A Certainly not known to me.

'' Q Not known to you-I think that is all.''
It is obvious therefrom that both doctors agree
that the importance of the factors of fatigue and exertion depends upon the degree to which they are present,
and the individual they are present in. In other words,
as the saying goes, what is one man's meat is another
man's poison. The facts stated in the hypothetical question leave it purely a matter of conjecture as to how
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much the deeea~ed ''as fatigued (it depend~ on the individual), and equally a matter of conjecture as to how
much he wat' exerting himself. The exertion is described as "'tinkering" about, and "off·and on cranking"
of the motor. .:\8 a matter of fact, other than that it was
· •small". the motor isn't even described, nor is there any
evidence of ho'v much effort is required to crank it whether a mere flip of the wrist, or something more
strenuous.
Thus, from the end result of the coronary, and
from that alone, the doctors assumed sufficient fatigue,
effort, stress and what not were present to induce the
result, but there is no evidence whatever as to the degree
in which these factors in fact were present-if at all.·
In other words, the doctors said that if present to
a sufficient degree fatigue, effort and stress could
produce a coronary. They admitted they didn't know
the extent to which they were here present, but as a
coronary occurred they ''assumed'' they were present
to the requisite degree and this despite the fact they
both admitted coronaries could occur without any of
these factors present. It is small wonder that the Commission looked upon their opinions as nothing more than
glorified guesses.
This Court has stated and restated the proposition _
that an award must be predicated upon substantial
evidence, and that it cannot rest upon surmise or conjecture.

Continental Casualty Co. v: Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 220, 284 P. 313.
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Higley v. Industrial Commission, 75 Utah 361,
285 P. 306.
Sugar v. Industrial Commission, 94 Utah 56,
75 P. 2d 311.
General Mills v. Industrial Commission, 101,
Utah 214, 120 P. 2d 279.
Royal Canning Corp. v. Industrial Commission
101 Utah 323, 120 P. 2d 406.
Yet isn't that exactly what must here be done if an
award is to be ·based upon the evidence in this cause?
Both Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson admitted that whether
exertion or fatigue or stress or lack of oxygen were
factors in producing the coronary depended upon the
''degree'' to which they were present. Both admitted
that they did not know as a matter of fact the degree to
which any were present. The hypothetical question,
while stating a factual background from which some
fatigue, some exertion, possibly some mental stress, and
possibly some oxygen deficiency might be inferred, left
it wholly a matter of conjecture or speculation as to
the degree they were present, and their effect upon this
individual. The doctors recognized this hiatus in their
chain of reasoning, so they started from the end results
and worked back-saying that since he had a coronary
they would assume that these factors were present to a
sufficient degree to have caused it, and that they did
cause it. This would be well and good if th~y would
take the position that these factors are necessary to
produce a coronary-for then it would be logical to say
that since there was a coronary it necessarily follows
that the essential producing factors were present.
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But once it is admitted, as these doctors do admit
(and for that matter all doctors) that coronaries do
occur where there is no evidence of the presence of any
of these factors> as it is in case of persons asleep, or
in hospitals undergoing complete bed rest, then the
logic of working back from the end result lose·s its
force.
Dr. Zeman testified on cross examination (Tr.- 135136):
"'Q What do you say about effort?
have mentioned that as one of the factors.

You

"A Yes.

'' Q Assuming he was performing exactly
the same duty under the same conditions exactly
the day before this as he was this day, that is,
he was tinkering With the motor as has been
described either with relation to the carburetor
or cranking it, exactly the same as the day before, would that have any effect upon your conclusion!
''A We may have a number of variables, all
of which are invariable. There might be one
variable which he had that will produce what we
have here.

"Q It might be a factor and it might not?
"A All I can say, we have the end result.

'' Q Oh, yes, we have the end result. You
are assuming now because a thing happened contemporaneously, they are related by ca.use and
effect.
"A In a way." (Emphasis added)
And again ( Tr. 137) :
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'' Q But nevertheless, you conclude that because there was fatigue, and the coronary ensued,
that therefore there is some casual connection
between the two, is that correct~
''A In this case, yes.''
And again (Tr. 138) :
"A I don't know what it was that is in this
case, but there was fatigue and also effort and
also emotion, and there may be enough in a
definite given case to produce a coronary occlusion.''
Now as to Dr. Olson ( Tr. 164) :

"Q Well, Doctor, when you get down to
brass tacks on this situation, in your op1n1on,
it depends on the extent of these factors you
have named as to whether there would be any
casual connection between them and the occlusion~

''A Only in degree. It is an individual in
his environment. In one individual it may take
a tremendous amount, and in another very little.

'' Q You didn't know this

individual~

''A No, but I know he had coronary thrombosis.

"Q But you didn't know this particular individual, and you don't know the effect or the
effects it may have had on this individual~
''A Not definitely, no.

'' Q So you can't tell, can you, to what extent these various factors would affect this man
as a particular individual¥
''A As a matter of knowledge, no.''
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And again ( 'l'r. 166) :

"Q Then you would only include effort~
"A Yes.

Q Then the extent of that effort would also
have a bearing, would it not, as a factor~
4

'

''A Upon a given individual, and on this
individual, under the circumstances and in the
environment.

'' Q In other words, it would have to he a
combination~

''A Yes, acting upon a particular individual.

'' Q Acting upon a particular individual, and
the extent to which these factors collectively
would act on a particular individual is not known
to you or anybody else 7
''A Certainly not known to me.''
Thus, it is apparent that both Dr. Olson and Dr.
Zeman, in order to reach the conclusions they did, had
to assume the existence of the factors to the degree
necessary to produce the result. There was and is no
evidence whatever in the record with respect to degree.
The most that can be said is that there is some evidence
of some effort and some fatigue, and possibly some
emotional stress and some oxygen deficiency. Under
those circumstances it may have been all right for the
doctors arbitrarily to assume the presence of these
factors to the necessary degree, but certainly the Commission wasn't required so to do. In fact for it to
have so done would have been error.
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The important thing in this case according to these
two doctors is the question of the degree to which their
factors were present. There is no evidence whatever
upon this question of degree. It must be supplied by
conjecture and speculation. The doctors, in order to
reach a conclusion, may take the end result and work
backwards, and come up with the necessary degree, but
the commission cannot do so. The doctors may reach
a conclusion predicated upon conjecture and guess work
if they elect so to do. They are controlled in that regard only by their consciences. But the Commission is
controlled by law, and the law says, speaking through
this court, that the Commission may not make an award
upon conjecture and surmise. It must have substantial
evidence. And in this case, substantial evidence of
what? Substantial evidence of the degree to which the
factors essential to Dr. Zeman's and Dr. Olson's theories
were in fact present.
That an opinion based upon speculation or conjecture is wholly without probative force has long been
recognized by the courts. Similarly without weight is
an opinion based upon a contingency.
Henley v. Braden (Ky) 91 S.W. 2d 34.
Webster v. Archer (Md- 4 A. 2d 434.
Masser v. Foxworthy (Colo.) 281 P. 360.
The contingency here, insofar as Dr. Zeman and
Dr. Olson were concerned, was the presence to the necessary degree of the factors effort, fatigue and stress.
Absent a showing by evidence of the presence of those
factors to tha.t degree, by evidence which the Commission was required in law to believe, those opinions were
wholly valueless.
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...-\.n interesting decision along these lines i~ that of
Hamilton v. Hueber, (Neb) 19 N.W. 2d 552, a workmen's
compensation case, wherein the employee suffered a
coronary while cranking a motor. The court held:

"'We have many times held that an award of
compensation cannot be sustained if based upon
possibilities, probabilities, conjectural or speculative evidence. Williams v. Watson Bros. Transportation Co. 145 Neb.--, 16 N. W. 2d 199, 202.
''However, viewing the expert evidence in
its most favorable light to the plaintiff, it is
quite apparent that the expert premised his conclusion-s upon the existence of two fact elements,
an overexertion and a fall.
''We recently have held: 'The val-p.e of the
opinion of an expert ·witness is dependent on.
and is no stronger than, the facts on which it is
predicated. The opinion has no probative force
unless the premises upon which it is based are
shown to be true.' Williams v. Watson Bro~.
Transportation Co., supra.''
" * * *

"There is no evidence in this record of any
overexertion or of any particular amount of
exer:tion in the work of attempting to start this
engine. It does not appear that the deceased
told the doctor of any overexertion. The testimony in the record as to the method of starting
this engine, the short pull or jerk followed by a
pause and rewinding, the small amount of force
necessary in the process, all negative any inference or conclusion that there was or could
have been any overexertion. Mere exertion, w:hich
is not greater than that ordinarily inciqent to

27
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the employment, which combined with pre-existing disease produces disability, does not constitute a compensable accidental injury.''
We have the utmost sympathy for the survivors of
this decedent. We likewise have the utmost sympathy
for the members of this court in their endeavors to
benefit such survivors financially, but we respectfully
submit that the majority opinion exemplifies perfectly
the old adage that "hard facts make bad law". To
cope with these "hard facts" the majority in effect
instructs the commission to ignore the fact that there
is no substantial evidence of the degree to which effort,
fatigue, stress and oxygen deficiency were present, and
to assume without evidence, as the doctors did, that
they were present to the requisite degree.
We return momentarily to the case of Morris v. Industrial Commission, supra, and the requirements laid
down by this court for reversal by it of a judgment of
the Commission denying an award. This court there
observed:
"In this case even if conditions (a). (b)
and (c) were present (i. e. that the evidence is
uncontradicted, that it is not intrinsically improbabh~, and that it is not entirely from interested witnesses) which they are not, the RtJplicant 's whole case would rest on the a biiity
of the opinion evidence to carry conviction. If
the party appealing should have put one or
more doctors on the stand to give opinion evidence, and even though uncontradicted it did not
carry conviction either because of speculation
or improbability inherent in it or because the
doctors themselves stated that their opinions
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were nothing more than intelligent gue~~e~, <~-:
frankly stated in this case by Dr. Spragtw and
at least one other doctor, the commission would
not be required as a matter of law to folio\\'
such evidence.''
That exnetly is the situation here. Dr. Olson's and Dr.
Zeman's conclusions require the assumption of a degree
of fatigue, effort, strain, etc. They admit they did not
know the degree to which they were present. Hence,
their conclusions of causal connection of necessity could
not be more than intelligent guesses. This is confirmed
by the testimony of Dr. Petersen to the effect that it is
impossible to tell in any particular case whether there
is any casual connection between effort, fatigue, stress,
etc. and a coronary. This was but another way of
saying that the doctor who dogmatically says there is
or is not a connection is but guessing.
The majority says:
''It was not for Dr. Petersen to say whether
Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson were sure of their
opinions and thus, in effect, to evaluate their
testimony.''
But why wasn't it~ In every case where there is
a contradiction between witnesses isn't each in effect
evaluating the testimony of the other as valueless 1
Take a simple case. Witness A testifies an object is
round, and Wi~ness B that it is square. Isn't each, by
contradicting the other, evaluating the other's testimony1 Now assume that Witness B, instead of testifying the object was square, testifies instead that
"No one can say what shape it was. The
night was dark and the object was not visible.''
:29
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Would it be suggested, under these circumstances, that
the trier of the fact would be obliged as a matter of
law to find that the object was round 1 Certainly not.
As the trier of the fact he could find that the premise
upon which A's testimony rested, namely, that he could
see the object, did not exist, and thereupon refuse to
find that the object was round.
Now why isn't that the case here of the medical
testimony1 Dr. Olson and Dr. Zeman say the fatigue,
effort, stress, etc. was the cause. Dr. Petersen said
"No one can say with any degree of certainty." Where
is the impropriety in that testimony1 Why is Dr.
Petersen without right thus to evaluate the testimony
of Dr. Olson and Dr. Zeman 1 And most of all, why is
the Commission not entitled to believe the testimony of
Dr. Petersen that "no one can say", and thus conclude
that the affirmative opinions at most were intelligent
guesses1
This court has held that the Commission may not
without reason disregard uncontradicted evidence, but
it has, of course, further held that the Commission is
not required to believe evidence inherently unreasonable
or improbable, even though uncontradicted. Dr. Petersen testified that whether there was any causal connection is ''impossible to say''. If this be so ,and the '
Commission was entitled to believe him, then the affirmative testimony of Dr. Olson and Dr. Zeman becomes
"unreasonable", and of the type the Commission was
not required to give credence to. It's like the example
previously referred to-if the trier of the facts believes
that the night was dark he is not required to believe
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the uncontradieted eYideuee or the witness that the
object \\as round. This because the witness's inability
to see renders unreasonable his testimony as to the
object's appearance. By the same token, if the ·commission believed that the subject was full of contradictions, as reflected in the medical literature; that
just as many coronaries occurred where there was no
evidence of effort, fatigue or emotional stress as when
there was such evidence; then the Commission was not
arbitrary in not agreeing with the conclusions of the
doctors, even though their conclusions were uncontradicted, because they become unreasonable.
We perhaps unduly labor the matter, but the importance of the subject undoubtedly warrants its every
consideration. To that end we would approach the
question of whether the Commission was arbitrary in
not accepting the conclusions of Dr. Zeman and Dr.
Olson because their testimony was ''uncontradicted''
-assuming it was. In this particular connection what
we want the court to bear in mind is that what we
have at most is an uncontradicted opinion, as distinguished from uncontradicted evidence as to facts. In
other words, is the opinion of an expert, even when
uncontradicted, conclusive upon the trier of the fact.
We submit not. Cases upon this subject are legion,
and among other places may be found cited in the foot
notes to the text in 32 C.J.S. (Evidence) page 389, et
seq.
This court has spoken in regard thereto in Kelly
v. Industrial Commission, 80 Utah 73, 12 P. 2d 1112:
:Jl
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"The question of whether the employee was
totally and permanently disabled was the ultimate
matter to be decided by the commission, upon all
the evidence in the case. Upon this direct
question expert witnesses may not properly express opinions. Utah Copper Co. v. Ind. Com.,
69 Utah 452, 256 P. 397. ~so see Annotation,
78 A. L. R. 755. .At least the commission is not
bound by such opinion evidence.''
We recognize that there is an exception, recognized
by some courts, to the rule that the uncontradicted
opinion of an expert is not conclusive upon the trier of
the fact, namely, where the subject concerns a matter
of science or specialized art of which a layman can
have no knowledge. Even that exception could have no
applicability here, because the question involved wa:;
not "what caused his death" (a coronary thrombosis),.
which we would agree is a question for the experts,
but whether such cause of death arose out of or in the
course of his employment. In other words, the opinion
as to the cause of death might be said to be conclusive,
but the opinion that such cause was industry connected
cannot be conclusive. This, of course, was the effect
of the Kelly decision, supra, wherein this court held
that the Commission is not bound by expert testimony.
in deciding the ultimate question involved.
We have heretofore suggested to the court that it
was not error for the Commission to fail to find that
there was no unusual strain or overexertion, that there
was no unusual fatigue, and that there was no emotional
stress. At the risk of unduly prolonging this supporting brief we refer briefly to the evidence from which we
contend the commission was justified in so finding.
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Flora K. Jones, the widow, testified that on the
night preceding his death her husband went to bed at
8:30p.m. That he lay awhile in front of the door and
later in his bed. He got up just before two. (Tr. 33).
Thus he had some five and one-half hours of rest. He
returned home from work at about 6 :30 A.M. for
breakfast, and then went back to work. (Tr. 41).
William 0. Glasgow, an employee, was at the viner
from about 4:30 A.:~.L to 6 :30 A.M. on the date of decedent's death. During this period the decedent spent
about thirty minutes helping the witness unload the
empty boxes from his truck and load it with full boxes.
The witness noticed nothing unusual about the decedent.
(Tr. 192-194).
The witness Spencer Porter talked with the decedent
at about seven o'clock in the morning of his death, at
which time he discussed the trouble he was having getting the motor started. ( Tr. 182).
The witnesses Elmer Potako, Othello Munn, George
Garner, Franz Fowers, Nelson W. Arave, and George
S. Moore all testified to seeing decedent at varying times
during the morning of his death, and testified as to his
activities. Their testimony showed that between two
o'clock, when he came to work, and eight-thirty, when
he first became ill, his activities were varied. He generally supervised the operations of the viner, he helped
Glasgow load his truck, he went home to breakfast, he
talked on the phone, and he worked over the small
motor. The nature and extent of his work on the motor
varied with the different witnesses-and incidentally
these were all called by the claimant. For example,
•)'""'

.._)tJ
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Othello Munn testified the decedent was "over the
motors all day" (Tr. 49); "he was at it all day long"
(Tr. 49); and "he was over the motor all day long
practically" (Tr. 50). This testimony the Commission
gave little credence to because it conflicted with other
known facts as to decedent's activities during the period.
On the other hand the witness Franz Fowers testified he watched the decedent for an hour starting at
three o'clock, at which time he was trying to get the
carburetor adjusted and at no time during this time did
he crank the motor. (Tr. 96).
Let's analyze it thus far. He came to work at two
o'clock. (Tr. 176). The motor ran satisfactorily for
about forty-five minutes (Tr. 182), which would be
shortly befort three o'clock. From three to four he was
adjusting the carburetor-not cranking (Tr. 96). For
at least thirty minutes between four-thirty and six-thirty
he was helping Glasgow load his truck (Tr. 192-194);
from six-thirty to seven he was at breakfast (Tr. 41).
At seven o'clck he was talking on the phone to the company mechanic, Spencer Porter, about the motor, and
Porter told him they would send down an auxiliary.
(Tr. 182). At some time between seven and eight-thirty
the decedent was taken ill ( Tr. 151). Thus, we have at
most a two hour period between four and six-thirty, and
possibly some time between seven and eight-thirty (although it is doubtful that decedent did much if any
cranking after talking to the mechanic Porter at seven
o'clock) when any cranking at all was done. It is
obvious, therefor, that despite the zeal of some of the
witnesses in behalf of claimant's cause he was not cranking the motor ''all day long'', or working over the motor
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"practically all day··. On the other hand, it is apparent
that during the six hours preceding the time he was
taken ill he did very little cranking. Actually, rather
than cranking, hi~ 'vork about the motor consisted primarily of trying to adjust the carburetor-or ''tinkering'' as some of the witnesses called it-with the big motor turning the little motor.
We realize, of course, that there was evidence to
have supported a finding of unusual exertion if the
Commission had believed, for example, Othello Munn
that the decedent was cranking all day long. That, however, it not the point. The Commission did not believe
that evidence, and our contention is that the evidence
as a whole is such that it cannot be said that the Commission was required to find, as a matter of law, that
there was unusual exertion. In other words, the Commission was justified in finding that his work on this
particular day was no more arduous or severe than
normal during the pea run. Also, in view of the fact
that he had some five and one-half hours' rest the night
before, albeit somewhat restless because of the heat,
he was not in that condition of fatigue necessary to the
conclusions of Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson.
Now, as to emotional stress, the only evidence
whatever on this is the testimony of the witness Earl
Christensen-a son-in-law of the decedent. His testimony was as follows:

"Q Did you observe anything as to Mr.
Jones' demeanor, and how did he look~
''A He was rather tired.

"Q He appeared that wayf
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"A Yes, he appeared quite tired.

'' Q Did the conversation have to do with his
physical condition or nervous condition~
MR. HOWELL: Answer yes or no.

"A Yes.

"Q What did he

say~

MR. HOWELL: I object to that as being incompetent, irrelevant and immaterial and hearsay, if your Honor please.
CO~L

WIErSLEY: The objection is well

taken.

"Q In the conversation, did he tell you he
was constantly having trouble with the machinery
breaking down, and being driven half crazy and
worried, and by reason of these effects he just
could not sleep.
MR. HOWELL: We object to it upon the
ground that it is assuming something not in
evidence, and hearsay.

COl\1. WIESLEY: Did this conversation take
place on the night of the 2nd~
MR. DOBBS : Yes, about fourteen hours before his death.
MR. HOWELL: Yes, and prior to any attack
of any sort so far as any evidence shows here.

COM:. WIESLEY: Do you remember exactly
what he said~
"A Yes, sir.
COl\1.. WIESLEY : I am go1ng to let him
answer.
''A He was milking the cows.
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CO~l. WIESLEY: You should rt>1wat tbd
conversation as nearly as yon can.

•'A He said he was having a lot of trouble
with the motor machinery in the viner, and I
asked him what sort of trouble he ·wa~ having and
he said the biggest thing that troubled him \YH'
this motor, that it would not run, and it would
backfire, and he said around the cracks in th<)
pipe of the exhaust was covered-he said it vYaf;
a white-yellow.
COl\1. WIESLEY: NowMR. PATTERSON: It is a part of the conversation and it relates to l\Ir. Jones' demeanor.
1\IR. HOWELL: I object to it as leading. He
has not said anything about the worry so far.
CO~I. WIESLEY: We are interested in hit-;
physical condition. What was the conversation
as near as you can remember~ We know ahout
the exhaust pipe and the grease and all those

things. What else did he

say~

"A I asked him that night if he would like
to ride up on the Highway Sunday, and he said
no, he didn't sleep well last night, it was too hot,
and he said, 'I am tired and I think I can sleep
tonight.' He said, 'I am going to try to go to
bed.'''
The sum and substance of it is that on the evening
preceding his death "he appeared quite tired" (which
certainly isn't unusual for anyone after a day's work),
and that he was having trouble with one of the motors
at the viner. From this evidence, and from the other
evidence that there was in fact motor trouble, the
majority of the eourt would require the Commission
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as a matter of law to find that such an emotional state
had been built up in the mind of the decedent as to
precipitate, or be a factor in precipitating, a coronary
thrombosis. And this despite the fact that no witness
testified that he was wrought up or mentally disturbed
over the matter On the contrary, the decedent's only
comment was that he hadn't slept well the night before
because "it was hot", but that tonight he was tired and
''I think I can sleep tonight.''
We respectffully submit that if, upon the state of
this record, the Court is to require the Commission to
reverse its findings, saying that as a matter of law
the Commission must find that there was unusual effort,
and abnormal fatigue, and emotional stress brought
on by his work, sufficient, either singly or in combination, to have caused this coronary, the Commission
may no longer maintain its position granted under the
statute as the finder of the facts.
No one in this whole world, including the doctors,
know how much effort, how much fatigue, how much
emotional upset was necessary to precipitate a coronary
in this individual, even under the doctors' own theory
of causal relation between effort, fatigue, stress and
coronaries. The doctors admit that what would be
sufficient in one person would be wholly insufficient in
another. Neither the Commission, the witnesses, the
doctors, nor this court knows to what extent, if any,
the effort, the fatigue, and the strain here present affected the physical condition of this decedent. All that
is known is that the decedent had a coronary, and that
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in some instanc.:es ( ael·ording to some doctors) effort,
fatigue or emotional upset, working upon a body properly ripe for tt. may cause a coronary.
Based wholly upon the end result of the coronary,
and despite the fact that coronaries may occur and in
no wise be attributable to effort, fatigue or stress, the
majority of this court would say to the Commission that
it has no right nor power to find what the facts are with

respect to the effort, fatigue and stress here present,
and their effect upon this individual, but must find, as
a matter of law, that they were here present in sufficient degree to meet the wholly unknown requirements of Dr. Zeman and Dr. Olson.
This, to us, is the equivalent of holding that where
a coronary occurs while the individual is at work it
will be conclusively presumed to be industry connected.
If that is to be the law in Utah then industry must know
it in no uncertain terms and govern itself accordingly
in its employee relationships.
Such a fundamental change 1n the law, however,
is a matter for the Legislature, not for the court, and
until the Legislature speaks on that subject the power
of the Commission to find what the facts actually are
must be left undisturbed.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons we respectfully petition
the Court for a rehearing herein, and that it re-examine
the issues here presented.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON, Attorney
General of the State of U tab
Attorney for the Industrial
Commission of U tab.
HOWELL, STINE & OLMSTEAD,
Attorneys for
California Packing Corporation.
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